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Abstract 
From sustainable development (SD) through green growth to sustainable development 
plus (SD+)! Does the '+' really matter? This is the question that brings life to this article 
and the answer is: YES, it does. The '+' makes a huge difference especially for 
developing countries such as those  from Africa that for a long time have not been 
fully brought on board in shaping global discourses and the preferred future global 
development agenda. This article argues that the time has come  for globally 
privileged countries of the North to realize that operationalizing 'The Future  We Want' 
after Rio+20  demands that developing countries be  accorded unpolluted space to 
contribute to providing answers to difficult and elusive questions on the 
unsustainable ways of the past development paradigms. Among such questions are: 
When will the issue of resource intensive development and overconsumption  be 
finally answered?  Can green growth transition be part of the solution? How will a post 
2015 framework best address the needs of developing countries? The conclusion is that 
SD+ signals a deeper, wider and knowledge-based understanding of global (UN) 
sustainable perspectives that result in global citizens understanding The Future We 
Do Not Want. 
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Introduction 
 
The  Rio+ 20  outcomes document, 'The  Future We  Want', indirectly and 
strongly confirms the known fact that where we are coming from  as a global 
village is littered with  elements of The Past We Do  Not  Want. This  article 
audits developments in the past  22  years  since Rio  1992 when the sustainable 
development agenda was  firmly placed on the global map, through the green  
growth discourses that followed the 2008 financial crisis, to Rio+20 when the 
world  confirmed its allegiance to continue finding sustainable development 
 solutions and to building 'The Future We  Want ', up to the post 2015  agenda. 
Our past reminds us of slave trade, colonialism, the partitioning of and scramble 
for  Africa  and  other  developing continents, apartheid, wars of greed and 
overconsumption, violation of human rights  (even from those  nations that 
profess to be sustainable development champions), manipulation, challenges of  
the gross domestic product - GDP ('Gross Domestic Problem' as Lorenzo 
Fioramonti puts  it in his recent book  (Fioramonti 2013), hunger and 
malnutrition, financial crises, global warming and climate change, creation of too  
powerful institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), denied and  delayed compensation for  loss and  damage by  stronger 
nations, rampant corruption and many other challenges too numerous to 
mention here. 
 
It is the foregoing aspects that make one think deeply of our journey from Our 
Common Future to The Future We Want or, it should be said, The Future We Do 
Not Want. True, it would be hypocritical for us not to acknowledge the wonderful 
innovations and discoveries that have come from the past. The telephone, the cell 
phone, tablet, steam and combustion engines, the aeroplane, the rocket (military 
or otherwise), nuclear energy, information technology (particularly the Internet 
and social media), high speed train, organ transplants (including the heart) 
magnificent high-rise buildings, DNA, cloning, X-Ray, genetically modified 
organisms (GMO), the  satellite, electric motor, the discoveries are also too many 
to mention. Sadly, this human sophistication and artisanship have failed to 
eradicate intergenerational poverty and bring happiness to the earth's 
inhabitants, particularly those in Africa and other underdeveloped parts of the 
world. Uprisings, upon uprisings! Talk of the so-called Arab Spring. However, the 
world has now set its eyes on green growth, a development paradigm so opposed 
to the old growth path which was resource intensive (African Development 
Bank- AfDB 2013) to one  that is resource efficient. 
  
 The sophistication and artisanship have brought wealth and happiness to a select 
few. o, we can confirm that the sustainable development of old has not done what 
needs to be done- distribute wealth equitably, eradicate poverty, end wars and 
save the environment (the na tura l  capital base). It is against such a background 
that this work advances the notion of sustainable development plus (SD+). To 
fulfil the demands of the SD+ agenda, global citizens and leadership need to 
regard sustainable development as both a moral and ethical issue. Therefore, SD+ 
goes beyond the common three pillars of sustainability, namely, economic, 
environmental and social sustainability. Human beings simply need to do the right 
thing. We need new deliberation platforms and a world where equity is central to 
everything. Some  nations and individuals cannot continue to be more equal and 
quench their  thirst  through oppressing the poor. The moral compass has been  lost 
and greedy superpower nations must  lead  the way to find this compass. 
 
This article is divided into seven sections. The next section focuses on the 
methodology that was followed. Section 3 reflects on the period of the landmark 
publication, 'Our Common Future', whilst Section 4 draws  insights from 
discourses on transition from reducing emissions from deforestation (RED), 
through reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD), 
to REDD+. Section 5 is dedicated to the green growth transition pathway and 
Section 6 presents the proposed SD+ concept. The last section is the conclusion. 
 
 
Research methodology 
 
The article asks one major question: what form will the common and globally 
accepted concept of sustainable development take into the future? This question 
arises against the background of the Rio+20 outcomes that sets the world firmly 
towards  a renewed and somehow solid p l a t fo rm to continue along the paths 
o f  old in terms of sustainability. It takes mainly a literature survey approach and 
analyses the discourse on the three main subject areas: Our Common Future, green  
growth and SD+ (Van Dijk 1997). With thousands of publications on the  concept 
of sustainable development and  thousands more  emerging on  the  concept of  
green growth, the future the world wants and the post Millennium Development 
 Goals  (MDGs) agenda, the  author decided to take time to immerse himself in the 
richness of what is  already available. After this exercise, new ideas were crafted that 
try to link the old to the new and find spaces for further discourse. Following 
Sandig and  Selting (1997), this  critical review and  synthesis of existing literature 
will  inform global players of the need for a smooth migration from sustainable 
development through the green growth agenda to the SD+ epoch. The emphasis 
is that the article does not set dichotomies between the old views and the new, 
but seeks to blend the old with the interim and the new and vice versa. 
 
Our common future: Not good enough? 
Since 1987, the global leadership has accepted the publication and 
recommendations from one of the commonly cited reports providing a definition of 
sustainable development: 'Our Common Future' by the Brundtland Commission 
(Dixon and Fallon 
1989). Sustainable development is defined in 'Our  Common Future' as  
'development that meets the needs of the current generations without 
compromising the needs of future generations' (United Nations 1987: 11). 
Twenty-five years down the line, world leaders have evaluated progress on 
sustainable development addressed in 'Our Common Future' through the 
Rio+20 Summit in 2012. The recommendations sought to witness the 
environment and social agendas fully harmonized with the economic 
development agenda. This resulted in the widely accepted three pillars of 
sustainability: economic, environmental and social sustainability. Over the years, 
a crosscutting pillar  emerged, the governance pillar (Nhamo and Inyang 2011). 
Although many positives came out of 'Our Common Future', the document has 
been criticized, particularly on the definitions and the goals i t  sought to achieve. 
 
Drawing from the discourse in 'Our Common Future' and  writing in the late 
1980s, Dixon and Fallon ( 1989) conclude that the concept of sustainability became 
development rhetoric. This was owing to the fact that the Brundtland 
Commission on Environment and Development applied sustainable 
development as the main o r g a n i z i n g  string. In trying to trace the origin of the 
concept, the authors switch to the Latin equivalent of the word 'sustain', 
'sustenere'. Sustenere implies 'to hold up or keep elevated' (op. cit.: 74) and in 
 the context of natural resources management this means to maintain or prolong 
productive use of resources. Hueting (1990) saw  the  Brundtland Report as 
containing conflicting goals. In his view, the report somehow overstressed the 
need  to protect the environment and not the living conditions of a populace that 
need  to be improved when the environment is exploited. 
To  implement sustainable development, the  Rio  Earth Summit that took 
place in Brazil came up with Agenda 21 (Nhamo and Inyang 2011). This was an 
agenda for the  21'
1 
century that  would have witnessed the implementation of 
sustainable development leading to sustainability. However, progress was limited 
as many countries and authorities battled with pinning down the  notion of 
sustainable development into action on the ground. To this end, the economic 
pillar of sustainable development continued to dominate (Fioramonti 2013). As 
indicated in the introduction, there are outstanding issues from the  'Our 
Common Future' epoch; issues such as how to address overconsumption and 
greed, superpower and/or big brother syndrome, elusive poverty, joblessness and 
exclusiveness. These are issues that global leaders are still battling with today. 
 
However, one might not take away the credit from  Our Common Future, that it 
got the world talking sustainability. This is evident today as, 25 years later, global 
leaders are still embedded in 'Our Common Future's' terminology such as The 
Future We Want from  Rio+20 (Rio Pavilion 2012) and sustainable development. 
To further prepare the platform leading to SD+, the next section discusses 
transition from reducing emissions from  deforestation (RED) through reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) to REDD+ on 
climate change global negotiation platforms. 
 
From RED to REDD+ in climate negotiations 
 
Transition from sustainable development to SD+ can draw lessons from the 
transition that took place from reducing emissions from deforestation (RED), 
through reducing emissions from  deforestation and forest degradation (REDD), 
to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation plus (REDD+) 
(see Figure 1 below). All this took place within the sustainability context in the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Each 
 year the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC meet to deliberate 
developments concerned with the need to address climate change. RED first 
featured during one such COP: COPll that took place in Montreal, Canada in 
2005 (Hueting 1990). This was mainly driven by the need to have consumers pay 
for  environmental services provided by forests and to provide compensation to 
communities that would have managed to preserve their forests. This provided an 
additional incentive for compensating those from developing countries for such 
work. The developed countries would pay for the services whilst simultaneously 
assisting in bridging the  divide between them  and countries of the  south over  
general disagreements in the UNFCCC regarding the polluter pays fundamental 
(Nhamo 2011). Whilst the original idea of simple compensation for 
environmental services from forest conservation still holds, the debates shifted 
significantly as negotiators became more sophisticated both technically and 
politically, particularly drawing experiences from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol - an 
implementation framework to the UNFCCC. Although global leaders identified 
the need to have a separate agreement and/or convention on forests during the 
1992 Rio  Earth Summit, consensus could not be reached on such a comprehensive 
framework until COP11. It was Costa Rica and Papua New  Guinea that brought 
back  the RED agenda into  climate negotiations during COP11 (Brunner et al. 
2010). This was done on behalf of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations. 
 
 
 
Between 2005 (COPll) and 2007 (COP13), two expert projects on RED were 
undertaken and debates centred on the need to expand RED to include issues on 
forest degradation (Pistorius 2012). This was deemed to represent an additional 
 large  source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that are harmful to our 
environment. This resulted in an additional 'D' in REDD. This extra 'D' focused 
mainly on overgrazing (Brunner et al., 2010). However, debates did not stop, as 
India and China were of the view that REDD would promote compensation 
mainly for the protection of forests whilst excluding other utilities that 
developing countries need such as access to forests for subsistence (Nhamo 2011). 
As  a result, the inclusion of the '+' elements in REDD during COP15 followed 
(Corbera and  Schroeder 2011). Other countries such as the USA viewed the  '+' 
activities as having market-based mechanisms that would permit carbon 
offsetting although Brazil, which favoured a fund-based approach, continued to 
oppose this thinking and proposition (Pistorius 2012). Following a decision on 
REDD+ during COP15, a follow-up COP in  Cancun, Mexico, incorporated 
REDD+ under the Kyoto Protocol mechanism (Boyle et al. 2011). This meant that 
REDD+ now qualified for carbon trading credits on the carbon market. During 
COP19 in Warsaw, the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) 
(2013) reported that the Warsaw REDD+ Framework had been reached. The 
Warsaw REDD+ Framework (Third World Network 2013a) addresses aspects on 
financing, institutional arrangements and methodological package. These issues are 
due for finalization during COP20. 
 
There are a number of lessons that can be drawn from the transition from RED 
through REDD to REDD+ that may inform discussions on transition from 
sustainable development through green economy to SD+. Although REDD+ 
remains contested, it is credited with bringing aspects such as local participation to 
utilizing resources from RED and REDD and hybrid approaches fusing both 
market-based and fund- based approaches. These are seen as co-benefits for the 
livelihood particularly of the indigenous people and safeguards represented by 
the  inclusion of the '+' witnessed during COP15 in Copenhagen (Nhamo 
2010). In REDD+, stakeholders had to address aspects pertaining to risks 
associated with land grabbing, customary rights, and free prior and informed 
consent regarding indigenous and local communities involved in REDD+. 
Stakeholders engage in positives including 'conservation, sustainable 
management of forests, and enhancement of carbon stocks in developing 
 countries' (Boyle et al. 2011: 1). In as much as REDD+ has been generally accepted 
globally, challenges still exist, including how to measure, monitor and verify 
(MRV) the amount of GHG sequestrated; determining additions under the Kyoto 
Protocol mechanism and permanence and leakage (Venter and Koh 2012). 
 
Finance remains a key issue in REDD+. The World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility (FCPF) is one such funding mechanism and countries must be prepared if 
they are to get the funding. The FCPF readiness mechanism stipulates that these 
countries should develop a Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN). Such an R-PIN 
details how the host country of a project under the FCPF addresses good 
governance of forests. In a study on 25 approved R-PINs, Davis et al. (2009) 
focused on  17 pillars of the R-PIN which for ease of analysis they  grouped under 
six  basic processes. The six basic processes included: 
 
•   Law and policy development 
•   Land tenure administration and enforcement 
•    Forest management 
•    Forest monitoring 
•   Law enforcement and 
•    Forest revenue distribution and  benefit sharing. 
 
Outdated and/or unclear forest policies and laws, poor policy harmonization and 
mainstreaming across sectors, unclear land tenure rights and complex regulatory 
systems for law enforcement emerged as key readiness drawbacks for 25 countries 
in the case study.  African countries included in the research were: Cameroon, 
Congo, the DRC, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar and 
Uganda (Davis et al. 2009). The challenges highlighted here also apply in the SD+ 
generation. 
 
Overall, one concludes that the movements from RED, through REDD, to REDD+ 
clarified issues of inclusiveness, especially on how to deal with the less powerful and 
often marginalized indigenous and local communities from developing countries. 
The movement also included missing links from a single 'D' to two 'Ds' and a 
plus. This history lesson still remains relevant today as we move towards and 
 embrace the SD+ phenomenon. REDD+ challenges also provide red flags on how 
to monitor and implement SD+ as well as identify game changers such as the 
actions of Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea to bring back the RED debates into 
climate negotiations on behalf of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations in Montreal 
during COP11. The next section focuses on green growth with the aim of making a 
bridge to the SD+ discourses. 
 
 
The green  growth pathway 
The green growth pathway may be traced from the 2008 financial crises (Nhamo 
2013). Following the financial crisis, world leaders sought to have a one-stop 
shop for addressing global challenges including the energy, water, and food and 
climate change crises. Since the energy and climate change crises were dominant 
then, global leaders thought that a low carbon development pathway would be 
one such good solution. This thinking embedded a green mini 'revolution' within 
the  so-called financial stimulus packages. Countries that designated green stimulus 
financial packages diverted certain percentages of their stimulus spending towards 
low carbon development initiatives that addressed simultaneously climate change 
and energy crises. Later in 2009, the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) established the Green Economy Initiative as a major mechanism for 
addressing the multi-faceted challenges that included climate change, financial 
crisis, energy crisis and many other crises. To this end, the concept green economy 
grew phenomenally with new names and sub-elements emerging including: 
inclusive green growth, green growth, climate resilient development, low carbon 
development etc. (ibid.). Since then, a number of green growth national policies 
and strategies on green growth have emerged including those from South Korea, 
Ethiopia, Britain, Rwanda, Colombia, Ireland, China, Germany, Mexico,  
Colombia as well as a number of states in the  Americas (Global Green Growth 
Best  Practice Initiative 2014). 
 
After a few years of discourse and the implementation of green economy 
transition projects, most of which were in the energy sector, UNEPpublished a 
landmark document entitled 'Towards a green economy: Pathways to sustainable 
development and poverty eradication' in 2011. In the document, UNEP (2011) 
 advocates a set of five intertwined enabling conditions for green economy 
(applied in this article as interchangeable with green growth). These conditions are 
finance, governance, market, infrastructure and information. Within a green 
economy, DeSombre (2011) places responsibility on institutions. In her view, 
environmental and other institutions play a critical role in generating and 
disseminating green economy information. Such institutions assist in shaping the 
agenda both at national and international negotiation platforms. States commit 
to certain decisions on green economy and these must be implemented at the  
national level once ratified. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
(2011) identifies 10 high level conditions for a transition to a green economy 
based on the conventional pillars of sustainable development: economic 
sustainability, environmental sustainability and social sustainability. These 10 
conditions are so interwoven that missing one could be a line for a weak link and 
among such is included education and skills development (Figure 2). In 2009, 
Rwanda President Paul Kagame advised that: 
 
  
 
The environment is our life-blood; indeed the real surprise is not that ministries of finance 
are now talking to ministries of environment- but that it has actually taken this long. Even 
when we look beyond agriculture, tourism, mineral wealth and fisheries, our economies 
depend critically on good environmental stewardship. (Smith School of Enterprise and the 
Environment 2010: ii) 
 
 
Green and McCann (2011) are disturbed by lack of green economy research on 
how this economy impacts on organizations’ strategy, structure and culture. To 
this end, they conclude the world is in search of new theories that will result in 
the development of appropriate green economy leadership. In transforming 
leadership in a green economy, three elements are fundamental in the  authors' 
view: culture, leadership and values. Innovation and  technology transfer has its 
sub-conditions in a green economy. Tawney and Weischer (2011) set six conditions 
for supporting innovation and  technology transfer in a green economy. Such 
conditions must witness priority setting and coordination; joint research, 
development and demonstration; sharing information and knowledge; capacity 
building; provision of finance; and supporting hubs and networks. Capacity 
building includes both institutional and individual capacity, a critical aspect for 
developing countries like those in Africa. 
  
From Rio+20, the green economy emerged as a means of attaining sustainable 
development and poverty eradication (UNCSD 2012). However, readiness in 
climate financing is a critical aspect in green economy transition. The UNDP has 
prepared a document dealing with readiness for climate finance. In the document, 
the UNDP (2012: ii) defines what it implies by climate finance readiness which it 
says  is: 
 
...  the capacities of countries to plan for, access, deliver, and  monitor and  report 
on climate finance, both  international and  domestic, in ways that are catalytic 
and  fully integrated with  national development priorities and achievement of the 
:MDGs. 
 
From the work by the Global Green Growth Best Practice Initiative (2014), it 
emerges that a range of issues is addressed, namely, high level visions and  targets, 
benefits, prioritization of  options and  pathways, policy   designs, financing 
strategies, public- private collaboration as well as national and sub-national 
integration. All these facets are embedded in the planning and coordination 
processes that include monitoring and evaluation. However, financing green 
growth remains an issue requiring more focus. 
 
The African Climate Finance Hub (2012) believes that climate finance readiness is 
shaped by national circumstances and contexts. Hence it is necessary to realize 
the interwoven political and economic dimensions in a particular country when 
making efforts to strengthen institutions and processes dealing with climate 
finance readiness. The finer details contained in each of the four stages highlighted 
in the definition are presented in Figure 3. The UNDP (2012) also notes that 
although the  proposed framework is applicable at various spatial scales, it must 
not be seen as a one size fits all approach and model. 
 
 
 
  
  
 
In its hybrid climate finance readiness model that draws from the UNDP model, 
the African Climate Finance Hub (2012) identifies what it considers as principles 
and core components to take note of in the SD+ period. In terms of principles, 
climate finance readiness must be relative (to social, economic and political 
circumstances); responsive (to the need, priorities and challenges); and 
reasonable (in identifying key  issues and practical steps). The core components 
then draw directly from the UNDP (2012) model and the hybrid model was 
applied to assessing climate finance readiness in Namibia and Zambia. 
 
Regarding the green economy funding mechanisms, the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa (DBSA) (2011) came up with five typical funding mechanisms. 
These are: international donors, public finance, capital markets, climate finance 
instruments as well as equity and venture capital. However, national strategic 
implementing partners will be required and these were highlighted as the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC), commercial banks and the DBSA. These partners 
will have streamlined responsibilities. Six climate and green economy funding 
 mechanisms were identified in the National Climate Change Response White Paper 
of South Africa (DEA2011). These included public finance; development finance 
(the  DBSA, IDC,  Land Bank and Khula Enterprises), private banks and 
microfinance; investors like asset managers, venture capital and  private equity 
firms; insurers; as well as international and corporate grant- providers. Having 
outlined the discourse deliberating on green growth pathways, the next section 
is dedicated to a precise discussion on the proposed notion of  SD+. In this 
section, game changers resulting in multiple tipping points towards the SD+ 
notion are presented. 
 
Sustainable development PLUS 
 
It is difficult to discuss the notion of SD+ without touching on game changers. 
Game changers are a common but  difficult terrain to grasp. De  Cock et al. 
(2011) provide a synopsis of what game changers are. In their view, game 
changers 'are radical innovations that fundamentally change how something is 
done, thought about or approached' (De  Cock et al.  2011: S61); in the context 
of this article, this is the SD+ notion. In fact,  De Cock and his co-authors indicate 
that such game changers could be political, social or economic events. 
Environmental is a fourth category that should be added. Examples cited by the 
authors include cellular telephones, the Internet and social media.  To this list, 
should be added natural phenomena like global warming, climate change and 
the possible death of the combustion engine in the near future. Zheng (2010) 
identifies the discovery of DNA in the middle of the  20th century as one  of the 
global game changers. Game changers also relate to tipping points; phenomena 
that overcome the status quo by creating instability (Cains 2004) that requires 
seeking, either naturally or through the human power, new equilibriums. Tipping 
points  are not identifiable until a major  disaster occurs and  a number of such  
tipping points may have a cumulative effect leading to the displacement of the 
status quo.  Known examples, as is common knowledge now, include the 2008  
global financial crisis and the so-called Arab Spring. Hence, the green growth 
agenda certainly qualifies as one of the game changers leading to the SD+ agenda. 
In the introduction, game changers are mentioned and categorized under: old but 
 still relevant; new and relatively new; and possible future game changers. This 
observation fits well with the foregoing discussion. Some of the game changers 
this article identifies are presented in Figure 4, below. 
 
 
The choice of which game changers to sample has been subjected to the author's 
judgment call given the historical, current and future trends towards the SD+  
shift. Given the limitations of space, only a few of the identified game changers are 
discussed here to provide direction in the SD+'s emerging discourses. Over the 
years, global citizens have been battling with evidence needed to support the 
narrative that climate change is really taking place. Following the landmark 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007) report, many sceptics 
were converted as the evidence confirmed that, indeed, climate change was 
happening and was happening fast. Hence, humanity needed to urgently do 
something drastic if global temperatures were to be maintained below the 
manageable two degrees of the pre- industrial temperature range. Since 2007, 
observed decadal global combined surface- air temperature over land and sea-
surface temperatures continued to be unequivocal in terms of their upward trend 
(Figure 5) and again, humanity is challenged to do more in terms of reducing 
GHG emissions. To those in the field of sustainable development and green 
growth, global temperature rise is one of the game changers of note.  The world 
Metrological Organization (2013: 1) records the first decade of the 21st century 
(2001-2010) as the warmest since the 1850s and witnessed 'above-average 
precipitation, including one year- 2010- that broke all previous records'. 
Measured concentration of key GHGs showed increases of 158% for methane to 
 1,808 ppb, 39% for carbon dioxide to 389 ppm and 20% for nitrous oxide to 
323.2 ppb since pre-industrial times. This picture is frightening to responsible 
global citizens. As noticed by Ban Ki-Moon, the UN Secretary General: 'The 
danger posed by war to all of humanity - and to our planet - is at least matched 
by the climate crisis and global warming. The world has reached a critical stage in 
its efforts to exercise responsible environmental stewardship' (Smith School of 
Enterprise and the Environment 2010: viii). 
 
 
 
 
 
Another game changer linked to climate change has been the general increasing 
trend in all natural disasters that has the world talking on the concept of loss and 
damage. During the August 2008 3rd Session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long Term Cooperative Action under the UNFCCC, Munich Climate Insurance 
Initiative (MCII 2008) made a submission on insurance instruments for adapting 
to climate change. In the submission, the  MCII  indicated that  the  UNFCCC Bali  
Action Plan  called for  risk  sharing and transfer modalities as part  of addressing 
loss  and  damage in developing countries, especially those most vulnerable to 
climate change. This was in line with  the provisions from Article 4.8 of the 
UNFCCC and Article 3.14 of the Kyoto Protocol. The MCII put forward two  
pillars: the prevention and  insurance pillars. Under the Prevention Pillar, world  
leaders and  their  partners had  to  make the  reduction of  human and  
economic losses their  top priority. Under the Insurance Pillar, world  governments 
and partners had to come up with  a Climate Insurance Pool.  Since  then,  
discussion on loss  and damage has grown bigger with stronger voices from 
developing countries. 
 
Warner et al. (2011) indicate that during COP17 in Durban, South Africa, 
negotiators reached consensus on a Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) 
Work Programme on loss and damage that was established at COP16 with time 
lines from COP17 to COP18. Loss and damage came up as one of COP17 decisions 
(Decision 7/CP.17). During COP19 in Warsaw, the G77 and China presented a 
UNFCCC decision text to institute an International Mechanism on Loss and 
Damage (IMLD) (Third World Network 2013b). After lengthy deliberations 
(including walk outs by the G77 and China), the Warsaw international mechanism 
for loss and damage was established (Third World  Network 2013c). However, this 
did not happen although an interim measure to place the IMLD under the existing 
Cancun Adaptation Framework was agreed upon. Although still contested by 
the G77 and China, the establishment of the mechanism is a step in the right 
direction for many vulnerable Least Developed Countries and  the  Small Island 
Developing States. Loss and damage will remain a thorny issue under the 
proposed SD+ epoch. 
 
 The 2008 global financial crisis confirmed a new world  order as the rich nations 
from the northern hemisphere are now looking towards countries like China and 
the emerging Group of  Five  (G5)  economies of Brazil, China, India, Mexico 
and  South Africa for additional stimulus resources and leadership. Given this 
unfolding new world  order,  the call to embrace the concept SD+  makes sense as 
Africa and other continents now  have the real  chance to  determine own  
sustainable futures and take  the  entire  world along. The surrounds for 
susta inable development as popularized in Our Common Future of 
1987 through the green growth platform to SD+ is shown in Figure 6, 
below. 
 
 
 
‘ 
What emerges from Figure 6 is a clearer picture that the world has been refining the 
sustainable development agenda. As we welcome the year 2016 and beyond, a 
more precise and general consensus is emerging regarding The Future We Do Not 
Want(or as some put it, The Future We Want). Many dots of different sizes in 
Figure 5 represent the historical nature in which the sustainable development 
debates emerged culminating in a consensus with the publication of Our Common 
Future that presented the most widely cited simple definition of sustainable 
development. Added to this list is a publication on 27 September in the 1960s 
entitled the Silent Spring by Rachel Carson that ignited environmental 
movement in the USA (Carson 1962). Globally, summits, conventions and 
treaties have emerged. The 1977 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations 
Conference on the Environment came up with seven proclamations and 26 
 principles. Proclamation 1 acknowledges man as having the contradictory power 
to both positively and negatively influence ecological systems (UNEP 1977). The 
Stockholm convention was the result of widespread acid rains that degraded 
freshwater systems in Eastern Europe. Proclamation 5 of the Declaration 
acknowledged a need for humanity to control rapidly growing populations 
whilst Proclamation 7 brought in the notion of citizen responsibility for the 
environment from governments to corporates and individuals. 
 
Principle 1 gave birth to environmental rights  that are now common across  many 
global national constitutions. Other  principles address issues ranging from  non-
renewable resources, the role of the state in pollution prevention, the need  to 
maintain economic and social development, coordinated approaches to 
development planning, stability in commodity prices etc. World leaders gathered 
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 3-14 June 1992. The outcome was the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development. The Rio Declaration presented 27 
principles (UNEP 1992). The main aim of the Rio summit was to address key  issues  
emerging from  'Our Common Future', especially given that the world now had  
some  common definition on what sustainable development meant. Participants 
reaffirmed the Stockholm Declaration and sought to build on it. However, this was 
to be done within the context of broadening global partnerships. Out of the  Rio 
Earth Summit emerged major UN conventions like the Convention to Combat 
Desertification (UNCCD), Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD) and the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In Rio, global leaders 
once more confirmed the central role of human beings  in addressing sustainable 
development (Principle 1) (UNEP 1992). Other principles focused on issues of 
equity, special treatment to least and developing countries, capacity 
development, the need to enact effective laws, the precautionary approach, need  
for environmental impact assessments for development projects, the role of 
women in environmental remediation and protection, rights of indigenous 
people and their communities, and the polluter pays fundamental (ibid.). 
 
 
 
 
 Other initiatives surrounding the Our Common Future epoch of note include: the 
UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (2004-2014), the  
Millennium Development Goals (2000-2015), Tbilisi Declaration of 1977 on 
Environmental Education, UN Principles for Responsible Management Education 
(launched 2007), The King  Reports on Corporate Governance (now under King 
III), and the Global Reporting Initiative (GR1) (see for example, PRME 2007;Adams 
and  Petrella 2010; Nhamo and Swart 2012). Although The Future We Want still 
has a lot on the table, it may be achieved from a realization that there is no 
substitute for a sustainable global agenda. This is an agenda that puts people first, 
and sees all human beings as  truly equal. It is an agenda that speaks to 
individuals first  and  has  at the centre moral and ethics obligations. With this,  
The  Future  We Do Not Want- a future where there will be rampant 
joblessness, strife, poverty and fighting, may be avoided through the SD+ notion. 
In a recent paper, Heeks (2014) writes on a topic  'From the MDGs to the Post-2015 
Agenda: Analyzing Changing Development Priorities'. His  work concludes that 
the post 2015  agenda is 'the single most  important force shaping the future of 
international development' (p. 1). In the lead up to and from the Rio+20 Summit, 
the idea of Sustainable Development Goals  (SDGs) emerged as the post 2015  
desired output. This resulted in the institution of the Rio+20 United Nations 
Open Working Group on SDGs and the Rio+20 High-Level Political Forum. 
Linked to the Open Working Group is the Expert Committee on Financing. Four  
key documents are recognized as shaping the post 2015 agenda, namely, Realizing 
the Future We Want for  All (2012), A Renewed Global Partnership for 
Development (2013), A New Global Partnership (2013) and The  Future We 
Want (2012). Drawing from  the textual analysis on the highlighted key  
documents, Reeks found key   threads  that  include the  following aspects: 
food,  health, global, growth, energy, education, development, economic 
access, financial, environmental, sustainable, rights, progress, women, support, 
partnerships, targets, resources, poverty, social, united, United Nations, systems, 
work, well, etc.   
  
  
Following the major line of argument that in SD+ there is better  understanding of 
key issues Reeks just does  that in terms  of opening up this  space (Table 1). 
 
 
From  Table 1,  Reeks (2014) raises the top 20 post 2015 development impact areas 
as follows: environment and sustainability, migration, inclusive development, 
new stakeholders, development projects, open development, complex adaptive 
systems, technovation, new development finance, rights and justice, growth and 
jobs, livelihoods, services, rural/agricultural development, urban development, 
I\.IDGs 1-6, infrastructure, well-being, and informatics. There were also other issues 
that were  diminishing in their importance, among them: I\.1DG8 (A Global 
Partnership for Development). Under environment and sustainability, the key 
issues emerging confirm climate change, disaster risk reduction, renewable energy, 
energy security, and waste management. The political shift towards accepting 
climate change discourses and science in the USA is also mentioned. 
 
  
In the SD+ generation there is no doubt that the world needs to continue on its 
sustainable and green economic recovery path - a path that places emphasis on a 
resource-efficient growth model. 
 
Conclusion 
In mathematics a '+' sign denotes addition or adding on top of. In the context of this 
article, the '+' adds further insight on the paradigm of sustainable development as 
popularized in the publication Our Common Future. The '+' sign also touches on 
emerging discourses on green growth to SD+. A'+' sign is not equal to any other 
signs such as 'minus', 'equal', 'multiplication', 'division' etc. Sadly, as the world 
moved in to implement sustainable development since Rio 1992, we have 
witnessed serious subtractions and divisions especially from powerful, so-called aid 
and donor nations. Goal posts are shifted during global development and 
sustainability discourses. At times, utter stubbornness is displaced. Now that the 
world has a better understanding on what sustainable development could entail, 
the time to act has come. World leaders and individuals have a better grasp of 
what a global financial crisis means and how it may be avoided, what climate 
change damage is and how citizens may adapt  and mitigate it, what a resource-
intensive development path means and how it may be changed, what poverty 
and joblessness are and can do to all citizens globally, and above all, the promises 
of the green growth agenda and how we can keep on refining it for a better 
world. All this is what the proposed concept of SD+ seeks to disaggregate leading 
to a better life for all global citizens. Since we now know, let us then act 
accordingly from both the moral and ethics perspectives. 
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